The rivalry between the United States and China in cyberspace has become a key factor in how ASEAN countries shape their digital strategies. This competition plays out through infrastructure investments, cloud services, artificial intelligence, and digital policy standards. The stakes are high. Digital infrastructure decisions affect long-term economic competitiveness, cybersecurity, and national sovereignty. ASEAN governments now find themselves making choices that are technical, political, and strategic all at once.
China offers digital infrastructure at scale. Through initiatives like the Digital Silk Road, Chinese companies provide 5G networks, cloud computing, AI systems, and smart city platforms. Huawei and ZTE are central players in this effort. Their packages often come with low costs, soft loans, and bundled services. These offerings are attractive to developing countries with limited budgets. Several ASEAN states have taken up these deals, seeing them as fast solutions to digital gaps.
The United States pushes back. It frames China’s digital exports as a security risk. U.S. officials claim that Chinese companies, especially those like Huawei, could provide access to sensitive data for the Chinese government. To counter this, the U.S. promotes what it calls trusted technology partnerships. These include efforts like the Clean Network program, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. These frameworks offer an alternative vision based on transparency, rule of law, and open standards. But they often move more slowly than Chinese programs and come with political or regulatory conditions.
ASEAN countries do not choose sides in formal terms. They adopt strategies that mix suppliers and avoid exclusive alignment. Vietnam has taken a hard line against Huawei, opting for European vendors like Ericsson and Nokia. Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia accepted Huawei as a core 5G provider. Indonesia balances both sides. It works with Huawei on AI and cloud computing but also hosts major U.S. tech companies like Google and Amazon. Singapore acts as a neutral hub, allowing both Chinese and American companies to operate cloud services and data centers, while maintaining strict local regulations.
These decisions reflect a trade-off between cost, capability, and control. Chinese providers offer complete systems at lower prices. They deliver quickly and operate with fewer demands on governance or transparency. U.S. firms offer stronger privacy standards and global integration but at higher prices and with longer approval cycles. Each ASEAN country calculates these trade-offs based on its domestic needs and external relationships.
Cloud infrastructure is another point of competition. Chinese firms such as Huawei Cloud and Alibaba Cloud are expanding their presence in Southeast Asia. They offer local data centers, AI platforms, and enterprise services. U.S. companies, including Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud, dominate the global market and have strong partnerships in Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Governments in the region must decide which cloud providers to support, where to store data, and how to regulate cross-border data flows. These decisions affect national cybersecurity, access to global platforms, and the ability to maintain control over sensitive information.
AI development adds another layer. China promotes its AI models and tools through state-backed partnerships, university exchanges, and technology parks. It integrates these efforts with its broader diplomatic and commercial goals. The U.S. supports private-sector innovation and brings global market access, but it expects adherence to intellectual property norms and international standards. ASEAN countries benefit from both sides. They receive training programs, pilot projects, and research grants. But they also face pressure to adopt different ethical and governance frameworks for AI, including rules on data use, facial recognition, and algorithmic transparency.
The U.S.–China rivalry also affects digital regulation. ASEAN states increasingly develop their own data protection laws, cybersecurity frameworks, and digital economy plans. These laws must navigate between two competing models. China supports a state-led, surveillance-enabled model that emphasizes control and data sovereignty. The U.S. and its partners push for open data flows, multi-stakeholder governance, and interoperability. Regional governments adopt hybrid approaches. They seek local control over data, but also access to global markets and platforms.
ASEAN countries want to maintain digital sovereignty. They aim to avoid dependence on any single power. This is not easy. Major digital infrastructure often comes with long-term technical dependencies. Vendor lock-in makes it hard to switch providers. Software systems, training, and support services tie clients to their original suppliers. The larger the investment, the harder it becomes to diversify. To reduce these risks, several ASEAN states invest in domestic digital capacity. They promote local startups, invest in data centers, and create national cloud platforms. These efforts remain limited but show growing interest in building independent capabilities.
Defense and cybersecurity cooperation reflect the same pattern. The U.S. conducts joint cyber drills, information-sharing programs, and capacity-building efforts with several ASEAN members. Japan and Australia also support these efforts. China engages more through commercial and technical channels. It trains officials, offers smart city solutions, and embeds its companies in digital infrastructure projects. Each side uses different tools, but the goal is similar: to build long-term influence over how digital systems are built, governed, and defended.
Public perception matters. In countries like Vietnam and the Philippines, there is strong public support for reducing dependence on China. In others, like Cambodia or Laos, Chinese investment is welcomed and seen as non-political. These perceptions shape policy space. Governments must weigh the political cost of alignment against the benefits of investment and technology access. National elections, public protests, and media narratives affect how leaders frame digital partnerships.
The competition will continue. Neither China nor the U.S. is retreating from Southeast Asia’s digital space. Each will expand its footprint through 5G rollouts, cloud expansion, AI services, and regulatory engagement. ASEAN’s strategy of digital hedging will face pressure as systems become more integrated. Countries that rely heavily on one side for digital infrastructure may lose leverage in other areas. Those that maintain diversity may face higher costs and slower rollouts.
Still, ASEAN states retain agency. They choose based on national interest, not ideology. They compare costs, conditions, and strategic outcomes. The region’s digital future will not be shaped by declarations but by contracts, investments, and policy decisions. As the U.S.–China rivalry deepens, the choices made now will define access, control, and influence in the region’s digital economy for decades.
